Monday, September 24, 2007

Olympic Fever

Austin Ramzy. Time. (Canadian edition). Toronto: Aug 20, 2007. Vol. 170, Iss. 8; pg. 7, 1 pgs
Abstract (Summary)

The evening was gaudy confirmation of why next summer's Games are often referred to as China's coming-out party. For its rulers, the Olympics are a chance to show that their country is no longera jittery backwater of a nation but a dynamic, confident giant. For many human-rights activists around the world, however-for whom Tiananmen is a word signifying more than a square in the middle of Beijing-China's Olympic dream is nothing to celebrate. So the one-year mark before the Games has seen an outpouring of protest as much as of pageantry. On the Great Wall, a massive banner that read ONE WORLD, ONE DREAM, FREE Tibet 2008, was unfurled by half a dozen supporters of Tibetan independence.

Full Text (373 words)

[Headnote]
THE MOMENT
Will China be ready for the spotlight, and the scrutiny, that the Games bring?

AT THE AUSPICIOUS TIME OF 8:08 p.m. on Aug. 8, precisely one year before the Olympic Games are to open in Beijing, China held a celebration of the coming festivities in Tiananmen Square. The Gate of Heavenly Peace, where Mao Zedong's portrait still hangs, was bathed in red and gold light for the event, which featured intricately choreographed dance routines, multiple pop stars and, of course, fireworks.

The evening was gaudy confirmation of why next summer's Games are often referred to as China's coming-out party. For its rulers, the Olympics are a chance to show that their country is no longera jittery backwater of a nation but a dynamic, confident giant. For many human-rights activists around the world, however-for whom Tiananmen is a word signifying more than a square in the middle of Beijing-China's Olympic dream is nothing to celebrate. So the one-year mark before the Games has seen an outpouring of protest as much as of pageantry. On the Great Wall, a massive banner that read ONE WORLD, ONE DREAM, FREE Tibet 2008, was unfurled by half a dozen supporters of Tibetan independence. Outside the Beijing Olympic organizing committee's quarters, officials from Reporters Without Borders called for the release of imprisoned Chinese journalists. As if to dramatize their point, police detained a group of foreign reporters covering the event. Protesting Beijing's support for repressive governments like those of Burma and Sudan, some activists have launched a campaign to boycott the Games if China's policy does not change.

Chinese officials have repeatedly demanded that the Olympics not be politicized. But Olympic history-from the horrors of Munich in 1972 to the boycotts of the Games in Montreal, Moscow and Los Angeles-suggests that's a forlorn hope. "The Olympics are about human nature," says Bao Tong, a former adviser to Zhao Ziyang, the reformist Communist Party General Secretary at the time of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. "You cannot separate the Olympics from human rights." You might suppose that the Chinese government would have thought of that before it entered its bid to host the games.

Sunday, September 23, 2007

Will Tibet's culture simply fade away?

Isabel Hilton. New Statesman. London: Dec 27, 2004-Jan 3, 2005. Vol. 17/18, Iss. 839/840; pg. 27, 1 pgs
Abstract (Summary)

Despite the hopes initially raised by these contacts, it remains highly improbable that the Chinese government's idea of "return" would include letting the [Dalai Lama] live in Tibet: the tenth Panchen Lama, who died in 1989, had not been allowed to live in Tibet since the early 1960s. Beijing's longer-term plan is to wait until the Dalai Lama dies, in the hope that, without this high-profile reminder of Tibet's history, culture and past political status, the issue will simply fade.


Full Text
(478 words)

In a prison cell in the province of Sichuan, a 54-year-old Tibetan lama awaits execution. Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was convicted two years ago of causing explosions in Sichuan and sentenced to death. His sentence was deferred for two years, but when the deferment expired on 2 December, Tenzin Delek became eligible for execution. His co-accused, Lobsang Dhondup, was executed in January 2003, on the very day he lost his appeal to the Sichuan Provincial Court.

The trial of both men was a judicial farce. No evidence was produced to link the men to any crime. Their lawyers were not allowed to attend. Even by China's lamentable judicial standards, it was a travesty. Tenzin Delek is a respected monk who is well known for his charitable work. His real crime appears to be his loyalty to the Dalai Lama who, despite more than 30 years in exile, retains the devotion of many Tibetans. China's dilemma for more than 50 years has been how to transform the military occupation of Tibet into a stable political order, given that few Tibetans seem willing to give Beijing their loyalty or affection.

China has tried many different strategies from outright repression to attempted negotiation, but Tibetans remain, on the whole, stubbornly ungrateful for the privilege of being occupied by China. Yet the latest strategy - to encourage Chinese colonisation and to promote economic development in the hope that Tibetan culture will be obliterated, and with it Tibetan memory - may succeed in the long term: a similar approach in territories such as Inner Mongolia has all but erased the culture of the original inhabitants.

Over the past 14 months, Beijing has revived contact with the government in exile, raising hopes of a negotiated return for the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans who might still wish to return, but the exchanges proceed with glacial slowness and have not yet led to substantive discussions. Such discussions, the Chinese government insists, cannot take place until two conditions are met: that the Dalai Lama renounce his claim for independence for Tibet, something he did nearly 20 years ago and has frequently reiterated since, and that he declare that Taiwan is a part of China, which he might legitimately regard as a matter in which he has little standing. It is difficult to regard such demands as anything other than tactics designed to obstruct and delay.

Despite the hopes initially raised by these contacts, it remains highly improbable that the Chinese government's idea of "return" would include letting the Dalai Lama live in Tibet: the tenth Panchen Lama, who died in 1989, had not been allowed to live in Tibet since the early 1960s. Beijing's longer-term plan is to wait until the Dalai Lama dies, in the hope that, without this high-profile reminder of Tibet's history, culture and past political status, the issue will simply fade.

Asia: Still Tibetan after all these years; Tibet

The Economist. London: Feb 3, 2007. Vol. 382, Iss. 8514; pg. 59

Abstract (Summary)

It was an odd remark to come from a Chinese government official. Instead of flaunting the 13.2% growth that his autonomous region reportedly achieved in 2006, he was openly contemptuous of the calculations. He may work for the Chinese government, but he is an ethnic Tibetan and, like many others, he is intransigently opposed to all things Chinese. His is a common tale in modern Tibet: even as they take advantage of some of the economic opportunities Chinese rule has brought, many Tibetans remain staunchly proud of their own culture. This belies Chinese propaganda portraying supporters of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan separatism as a dwindling minority. China embarked in 2000 on a drive to accelerate development in its backward western regions, including Tibet. Tibetans are still desperately poor, but on the whole they are better off than they once were. Tibetan tradition has not survived unscathed. Some young people are abandoning nomadic life for lucrative urban jobs. But if the true index of a culture's vitality is its adherence to its language, historical memory and religious traditions, Tibetan culture shows itself durable.


Full Text (763 words)

Economic advance is not winning all that many hearts and minds

IT WAS an odd remark to come from a Chinese government official. Instead of flaunting the 13.2% growth that his autonomous region reportedly achieved in 2006, he was openly contemptuous of the calculations: "The officials tell us what incomes Beijing wants us to report and then we just have to report those numbers, even though there are farmers earning far less." Worse, he has views on the limits of Chinese sovereignty. "Highest this in China, highest that in China," he says, in a caustic imitation of Chinese tour guides. "This," he declares, a hand sweeping out towards the mountain-circled horizon, "is not China. This is Tibet."

He may work for the Chinese government, but he is an ethnic Tibetan and, like many others, he is intransigently opposed to all things Chinese. His motives in working for the party are purely mercenary: "It's the highest paying job I can get." He also admits that he would like to visit India to see the Dalai Lama, Tibet's exiled spiritual leader. But, for now, he must earn money.

His is a common tale in modern Tibet: even as they take advantage of some of the economic opportunities Chinese rule has brought, many Tibetans remain staunchly proud of their own culture. This belies Chinese propaganda portraying supporters of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan separatism as a dwindling minority.

On the other hand, the official's story does not quite fit the image of modern Tibet fostered by China's critics. In their version, economic growth benefits only ethnic Han Chinese. China embarked in 2000 on a drive to accelerate development in its backward western regions, including Tibet. Since then, and especially since last year when a railway to Lhasa was completed, pessimists have been mourning in advance the death of Tibetans' unique Buddhist culture and identity.

Economic growth, it was argued, would bring a flood of Han Chinese immigrants, who would "Hanify" Tibet and murder its culture. But just as that culture survived China's invasion in 1950, the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959 and the devastation of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, so it is now resisting the subtler ravages wrought by economic progress.

China's western development policy in part reflects the government's belief that economic growth would quench demands for greater political liberty. If Tibetans grew richer, surely they would become friendlier to life under Chinese rule? And, indeed, some Tibetans are sharing the new wealth. Lhasa has become a magnet for Tibetans from across the plateau, drawn by the opportunities created there by the booming tourist industry for guides, vendors and hotel workers. Scholarships take Tibetan students to universities in Beijing and Shanghai.

Even outside Lhasa, some Tibetans acknowledge that Chinese economic policies have brought benefits. In the northern town of Nagqu, for example, nomadic herders now have houses to shelter them from the icy winter, thanks to economic progress and government aid. Recognising Tibetan poverty, the government recently announced that it would offer aid to more than 230,000 farmers and herdsmen. The statistics are fudged and many Tibetans are still desperately poor, but on the whole they are better off than they once were.

Tibetan tradition has not survived unscathed. Some young people are abandoning nomadic life for lucrative urban jobs. Unworldly lamas now boast Nike caps. As one bitter gentleman puts it, "there are those who have sold out to the Chinese."

But if the true index of a culture's vitality is its adherence to its language, historical memory and religious traditions, Tibetan culture shows itself durable. Loyalty to the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan language and a view of history in which the Chinese are illegitimate invaders will not die soon. Each year, thousands sneak across the border and receive "religious and cultural training" from the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile. Those who return pass the lessons to their compatriots.

Many of those who do not risk the journey to India work hard at preserving their Tibetan heritage. One mother says that she insists that her daughter learn Tibetan, and that many others do the same. "Chinese is important for work but Tibetan is who we are. If you come back to Lhasa in ten years, you'll see many more people speaking Chinese. But they would still be Tibetan."

Such ideas pose no immediate security threat to China. But their persistence in the face of genuine danger highlights the limitations of Chinese rule. China has, through force, won reluctant submission. Acceptance, however, cannot be bought.